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ARGUMENT
THE ARGUMENTS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY AND INTERVENOR (THE
ASSOCIATON OF COUNTIES) FAIL BECAUSE THEY MISIDENTIFY MR.
DAVIS5 FUNDING REQUEST AND OVERSTATE THE LEGISLATURE'S
BUDGETARY CONCERNS WHEN IT AMENDED THE UTAH INDIGENT
DEFENSE ACT (UIDA).
Mr. Davis, as an indigent client, has simply requested funding for an expert witness that
he would have had access to had he been represented by the Salt Lake Legal Defender's
Association (LDA). However, Intervenor Salt Lake County (SLC) mistakenly identifies Mr.
Davis' request as one for "noncontracting defense resources." SLC has attempted to justify their
misidentification of Mr. Davis' request by asserting that the 2001 amendments to The Utah
Indigent Defense Act (UIDA) turned any request by a non-LDA represented indigent into a
request for "noncontracting defense resources." See Utah § 77-32-1 et. seq. Furthermore, SLC
incorrectly argues that the legislature sought to completely overturn the State v. Burns, 2000 UT
56, 4 P.3d 795, decision when the legislature only considered the effect of the holding on
indigent defense planning, rather than seeking to overturn it.
Additionally, the Association of Counties (AOC) attempted to bolster Intervenor's
interpretation of UIDA by only stating the legislature's budgetary concerns in amending UIDA
without providing the Court with an appropriate context for which those budgetary concerns
were discussed. AOC attempts to justify its overstatement by stating that various counties'
limited indigent defense budgets were the sole ^practical considerations" behind the legislature
amending UIDA. However, if the AOC and SLC would have provided the Court with the full
context of the legislative history of the UIDA, it would have been clear that the legislature did
not want to overrule Burns, but, rather, wanted to limit situations in which an indigent defendant
could force the government to pay for costs of experts that were not contracted for by the Legal
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Defender's Association, which would significantly drive up costs to the government without a
compelling reason to do so. In so amending the UIDA, the legislature desired to avoid obvious
impractical defense scenarios that could end up actually causing higher costs to counties. But in
making their arguments, AOC and SLC both fail to recognize that the legislature can only limit
the indigent defense budget while adhering to constitutional requirements.
This reply will show that despite the 2001 amendments to UIDA, Mr. Davis' request was
not for "noncontracting defense resources", as SLC argues. Additionally, it will show AOC is
mistaken in its interpretation of UIDA because it failed to take into account the floor "debates"
that clearly illustrate that the legislature sought to balance a defendant's right to access to
necessary experts to maintain fundamental fairness, while at the same time create a mechanism
whereby an indigent defendant can still retain non-contracting experts if he shows a compelling
reason that the non-contracting resources are inadequate to obtain a fair trial. Accordingly, this
court should find that under UIDA Mr. Davis was rightfully requesting funding for an LDA
contracted expert witness and, thus, did not need to show a "compelling reason" first.
I. SLC Mistakenly Argues that Mr. Davis is Requesting Funds for a Non-Contracting
Expert Witness, when in Actuality he is Simply Requesting Funds for an Expert the LDA
has already Contracted with for such services.
The Brief of Intervenor SLC attempts to persuade the court to deny funding to Mr. Davis
by asserting that Mr. Davis is requesting the services of a "noncontracting defense resource."1
Yet, Mr. Davis specifically requested funding for an LDA contracted expert witness.
Under UIDA, if a county has contracted with a legal aid association to provide defense
resources, then the court shall assign such association to "provide" defense resources to an
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See, e.g. Appellee's Brief, p. 6: "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that there is no compelling
reason which would justify the court to authorize or designate a non-contracting attorney or defense resource for the
defense of this case." p. 12. "Davis has made no argument that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
find a "compelling reason" to go outside the LDA Agreement to authorize special defense resources."
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indigent. Utah Code § 77-32-302(2)(b). Thus, the act allows for a legal defense association to
contact with qualified experts they find reasonable in price. Accordingly, UIDA states that if
any indigent requests funding for a "noncontracting defense resource," despite the existence of
an indigent legal services contract, then the indigent must demonstrate certain circumstances to
obtain funding. Utah Code 77-32-302(2)(e).
Noticeably absent from UIDA is any language stating that an indigent must be
represented by the contracted legal aid association to obtain the benefit of contracting defense
resources. Id. This is despite the fact that the UIDA was amended post Burns, a case in which
the defendant had private counsel and where the court specifically stated that it was not required
for a defendant to have a public defender in order to access county funding for necessary experts.
It also logically follows that if a county has contracted with a legal aid association to provide
defense resources, then the court should consider any resource the association has contracted
with to be a "contracting defense resource" without regard to whether the indigent is represented
by the LDA or not.
Here, Salt Lake County has contracted with LDA to provide indigent legal defense
services, including expert witnesses. Accordingly, the most important determination for the
court is whether or not Mr. Davis' request for an LDA contracted expert witness is a request for
a "contracting defense resources."
SLC attempts to argue that Mr. Davis has not asked for a contracted defense resource by
asking this court to make an unnecessary interpretation of UIDA, rather than follow its plain
language. Specifically, SLC incorrectly implies that this court should narrow the meaning of the
phrase "contracting defense resource" due to the 2001 amendments to UIDA. However, SLC
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See, e.g., Appellee's brief, p. 9: "The Act again clarifies the procedure and standard for appointment of a
noncontracting counsel or defense resource in section 77-32-303."
3

provides inadequate justification for this court to look beyond the plain language of UIDA and
narrowly interpret the phrase "non-contracting defense resources" so that such phrase does not
include an LDA contracted expert witness.
a. SLC's argument that this court needs to narrowly interpret the phrase "noncontracting defense resources" in the UIDA is incorrect because it unnecessarily
ignores the UIDA's plain and unambiguous language,
SLC is arguing that an LDA contracted expert is not included in the phrase "contracting
defense resource" when a non-LDA represented client is requesting it. SLC attempts to justify
its proposed deviation from UIDA's plain language by stating that the legislature amended
UIDA due to the legislature's fear of excessive indigent defense costs. However, UIDA does
not specifically define the term "noncontracting defense resource." See, Utah Code § 77-32-201.
Thus, SLC argues that this court should go beyond the plain meaning of the word
"noncontracting" to hold that an LDA contracted expert witness would be a "noncontracting
defense resource" in certain situations.
First, SLC's interpretation of UIDA fails under general statutory interpretation principles.
When interpreting statutes, the court's primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent, as
evidenced by the plain language in the statute. State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56 at ^ 28. Only if the
court finds a provision that causes doubt or uncertainty in its application must it analyze the act
in its entirety and harmonize provisions in accordance with legislative intent and purpose. Id.
Here, the UIDA plainly states that indigents only need to show a compelling reason for
funding if they are asking for "non-contracting defense resources." The phrase "non-contracting
defense resources" is not ambiguous, and thus there is no reason for the court to look beyond the
plain language of the statute to attempt to determine the legislature's intent. The court should

3

See, Appellee's brief, p. 14.
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read the statute under its plain meaning and thus find that Mr. Davis is not asking for a "noncontracting resources." Rather, Mr. Davis is rightfully asking for an LDA-contracted expert.
Second, the court's plain reading of the UIDA would serve to satisfy the legislature's
goal of reducing indigent defense costs. Under the plain language, any indigent that requests a
LDA-contracted expert witness would be requesting a resource that the LDA has found
competent and reasonable in cost. Additionally, any indigent that requests a non-LDA
contracted expert witness would have to obtain approval of the court, and could only do so in
limited circumstances. See, Utah Code § 77-32-302(2)(e). Thus, the legislature's goal of
reducing situations where the government has to satisfy each indigent's private request for any
expert, despite the cost, would be satisfied.
b. SLC incorrectly argues that the 2001 UIDA amendments demonstrate the
legislature's desire to overturn State v. Burns, when the legislature sought to
refine UIDA due to its clearer understanding of the constitutional requirements
necessary for an indigent defendant post Burns.
SLC stated multiple times in its brief that the legislature sought to "expressly overturn"
the decision in State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, 4 P.3d 795.4 In Burns, this court held that a
defendant need not be represented by LDA to receive state-funded expert assistance. Id., \ 32.
Additionally in Burns, this court stated that a defendant need only show necessity and indigence
to receive funding. Id. After Burns, the legislature was understandably concerned about having
to provide excessive expert witness fees for indigents in the future; however, that concern only
lead it to address how to better manage indigent defense costs while at the same time preserving
a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial, including obtaining necessary experts. Thus, the
amendment to the UIDA did not overturn the constitutionally justified decision in State v. Burns',
rather, it modified it to balance those interests.

4

See, Appellee's Brief, pp. 13, 15.
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To justify its assumption that the legislature sought to overturn Burns, SLC cited a
portion of the House Floor Debate which related to Senate Bill 154 (SB 154):
"Senate Bill 154 deals with a recent Supreme Court decision that allows defendants to
utilize publicly funded expert witnesses and investigators even though the defendant may
be financially able to retain private counsel."5
First, Representative Curtis' statement did not state that SB 154 would overturn Burns.
Instead he specifically stated that the bill "deals" with a recent Supreme Court Decision. If the
legislature, including the house, the senate, or those individuals proposing the bill sought to
overturn Burns, then they likely would have said that they were proposing SB 154 to "overturn"
Burns.
Second, although the archives label this recording as a debate, an objective listener would
likely call this an attempted explanatory statement rather than a debate. Representative Curtis
simply made a statement to the house about the bill describing the reason he proposed it for
adoption. No one spoke in response to clarify his statement, and no one argued about its content.
Curtis spoke for less than 2 minutes, and then the House moved on to other topics of discussion.
Third, and most importantly, SLC did not provide an accurate representation of SB 154's
legislative history. SLC provided only Representative Curtis' statement while leaving out a
highly illustrative explanation of SB 154 by Senator Hillyard during Senate Floor Debate on
2/12/2001. During his explanation Senator Hillyard provided a very different purpose for SB
154 than that of Representative Curtis:
... Well the problem gets to be is a person may have some money so he can hire an
attorney, but doesn't have the money to buy the experts he needs at trial and that's been
kind of his problem as the courts have dealt... So what this bill basically says is we
acknowledge that right, but to use an expert you 11 have to take it off a panel that the
5

See, House Floor Debate Audio Recording for Senate Bill 154 on 2/26/2001.
Available at:
http://www.image.le.state.ut.us/imaging/bill.asp? method^ EM onclientevent&pcount=2&pO=Buttonl&pl^onclic
k.
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court appointed attorneys use all the time and they have a contract with the county so you
have these experts they can use, they 're good qualified experts, but there's a contract
limiting what they can charge on the fees and what the counties have to pay. I think it
makes sense to give the defendant the rights that he needs but still have some protection
to the county that you don't go out and hire some expert from New York and bring him in
and pay whatever charges he may have... 6
Senator Hillyard provided a more accurate assessment of the legislature's intent in
adopting SB 154, and shows that the legislature did not intend to overturn Burns by amending
UIDA. To paraphrase, Senator Hillyard stated that the legislature desired to continue to provide
rights to indigent defendants, even if they were able to retain private counsel. Furthermore, he
stated that the legislature's primary concern was limiting outrageous expenses for private experts
by allowing the county or defender associations to contract with a reasonably priced panel of
experts.
Finally, Senator Hillyard's explanation showed that the legislature intended to allow Mr.
Davis' request for an expert after when it amended UIDA. Mr. Davis was able to find the
finances to hire private counsel, yet he does not have the funds to pay for a necessary expert.
Therefore, he is petitioning the court for a LDA contracted expert, or in the words of Mr.
Hillyard "an expert off of a panel that the court appointed attorneys use all the time." Mr. Davis
did not desire to hire an expensive private attorney, and thus he did make the expensive request
that Senator Hillyard stated the counties were trying to avoid.
Finally, from the legislative history it appears that the legislature even intended on a
defendant obtaining contracted-for experts even when the defendant initially had funds to hire a
private attorney, but then became indigent subsequently. The present case is even a stronger
case for the courts permitting a Defendant to have the county pay for those necessary experts and
6

See, Senate Floor Debate Audio Recording for Senate Bill 154 on 2/12/2001.
Available at:
http://www.imageJe.state.ut.us/imaging^ill.asp?_method^_EM onclientevent&pcount=2&pO=Buttonl&pl=onclic
k
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resources that the Legal Defender Association already utilizes since Defendant has always been
indigent and remains indigent today. Defendant's retaining his current counsel was only after his
family and friends scraped together their meager resources and paid for his counsel themselves.
But Defendant has no control over his friends and family's finances and, thus, he remains
indigent. And even if he did have some control over their finances, their funds were completely
depleted in hiring Defendant's current counsel and his counsel is now essentially working pro
bono for the remainder of this representation, as he gets sporadic payments from family and
friends that from time to time as they can afford. And the government has not contested
defendant's indigency status in this regard.
Because the legislative history acknowledges that even in situations when the defendant
started out as a non-indigent defendant, but later became indigent, he is still entitled to
contracted-for experts and defense resources without having to meet the "compelling reason"
standard the government and the Legal Defenders Association asserts is necessary.
Therefore, if one takes into consideration the current language of the UIDA, the full
legislative history of SB 154, and the legislature's budgetary concerns, then one finds that the
legislature did not wish to overturn Burns, but instead to manage indigent defense costs while
adhering to the constitutional requirements this Court so clearly established in Burns. Burns
imparted a responsibility on the legislature to provide any indigent with necessary defense
resources. Burns, supra, at f 32. Thus, the legislature correctly sought to limit the costs of
providing necessary defense resources to indigent defendants by granting the Legal Defender's
Association the power to contract with only those the Legal Defender's Association had selected
and contracted with that were competent, yet reasonably priced.

8

Mr. Davis has shown that an LDA contracted expert is a "contracting defense resource"
under the plain and unambiguous language of UIDA. First, SLC incorrectly attempted to urge
this court into interpreting UIDA, when its plain language is clear and unambiguous.
Additionally, SLC s justification for asking this court to go beyond UIDA's plain language is
incorrect, as the legislature sought to manage indigent defense costs rather than overturn Burns.
Finally, SLC's use of legislative history to encourage the court to go beyond UIDA's plain
language was weak because it failed to include Senator Hillyard's explanation of SB 154 which
provided a more accurate assessment of SB 154 than Representative Curtis' statement.

II.

AOC's attempt to justify SLC's proposed interpretation of UIDA is weak
because it incorrectly argues that the legislature solely considered budget control
when it amended UIDA while ignoring its constitutional duties and multiple
practical ramifications.

AOC argues in its brief that the counties' need to predict defense costs illustrates the
legislature's desire to allow funding for LDA contracted defense resources only to LDA
represented indigents.7 Specifically, AOC argues that many counties have extremely limited
budgets, and thus the only way they can adhere to those budgets is if only LDA represented
indigents remain eligible for funding absent a compelling reason.
However, AOC fails to recognize the practical hurdle that the constitutional right to an
adequate defense creates in the legislature's attempt to predict costs, and the likelihood that the
legislature was aware of constitutional requirements when amending UIDA. Additionally, the
court's plain reading of amended UIDA will allow attorneys to alleviate time and cost to county
defender associations through pro-bono representation. Finally, AOC's attempt to bolster its

7

See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 7: "THE UTAH INDIGENT DEFENSE ACT... PROVIDED A STRUCTURE
FOR COUNTIES TO DEVELOP A WAY TO CONTROL INDIGENT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES."
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position by citing excessive expert costs is weakened by the fact that the court's plain reading of
UIDA prevents those situations from occurring.
a. Counties' ability to predict their indigent defense budget remains the same due
to their constitutional duty to provide all indigents with an adequate defense, not
just those represented by the Legal Defender's Association.
AOC claims that the legislature sought to provide counties with the ability to predict their
indigent defense budgets when it amended UIDA.8 However, whether an indigent retains private
counsel (due to pro-bono assistance or third party financial assistance) or retains the LDA, each
county must provide every indigent with an adequate defense. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 344 (1980) (Guarantee of effective assistance means indigents must be afforded adequate
legal assistance). An adequate defense includes the costs for necessary experts. Britt v. North
Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971). Thus, a county may not deviate from its responsibility to
provide indigent defense. Accordingly, each county will always have a limited ability to predict
their indigent defense costs because they cannot predict how many indigents will require
defenses every year, or which ones will need an expert.
AOC's claim fails because the county's budget prediction will be unaffected if the court
allows a non-LDA indigent access to LDA contracted experts. If the legislature sought to
provide only LDA represented clients with access to funding, then many indigents would have to
drop their private counsel and hire the LDA. Not only would those indigents then accrue witness
costs for the county, they would also increase the county's time and costs spent on providing
them a court-appointed attorney.
Thus, preventing non-LDA represented defendants access to expert witnesses will not
limit costs, nor will it increase counties" budgetary predictive ability. Therefore, the legislature

8

See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 14: "By creating a preference for county funded public-defenders, the
Legislature provided counties with the ability to reasonably predict and plan for those costs on an annual basis."
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likely did not desire to provide only LDA-represented clients with access to "contracting defense
resources" because it would not be limiting costs or improving counties' budgetary predictive
power.
b. The legislature likely considered many practical implications when it amended
UIDA, such as pro-bono indigent representation.
AOC implies that the legislature solely considered budgetary limitations in amended
UIDA without regard for various practical considerations.9 However, the legislature most likely
understood that Burns, and other U.S. Supreme Court cases, made it clear that they had to
provide expert witnesses to indigents, since Representative Hillyard specifically mentioned the
need to provide adequate defense resources to an indigent defendant notwithstanding that
defendant initially having funds to hire private counsel. See also Britt, supra, U.S. 226 at 227.
Thus, the legislature was aware that increasing the number of indigent defendants would present
a tremendous challenge on counties to provide adequate defense, especially if they rely on
defender associations alone. As such, the legislature likely wanted to maintain the ability of
attorneys to provide pro-bono representation that would satisfy constitutional requirements.
Further, under Rule 6.1 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, every attorney is
encouraged to provide 50 hours of pro-bono service per year. However, if this court is
persuaded by AOC's claim, then attorneys will likely avoid representing indigents if experts are
necessary because their representation would be ineffective if they could not pay for the experts
themselves or the experts were unwilling to do the work free of charge. See State v. Barber,
2009 UT App 91, 206 P. 3d 1223, at 120-21 (counsel's failure to investigate the availability of
expert witnesses deemed deficient on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim notwithstanding

9

See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief, p. 10: "Several examples of the costs and manner in which counties in Utah
provide indigent services illustrate the need the Legislature sought to fill when it amended the Utah Indigent
Services Act."
11

defendant had hired private counsel; the court held that defendant could have filed a motion for
funds to make the government pay for the expert, and nothing in the Utah Rules of Criminal
procedure or any other law required a defendant to be represented by LDA to gain access to
government funds for necessary experts: " Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that l![u]pon showing that a defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of an expert
whose services are necessary for adequate defense, the witness fee shall be paid as if he were
called on behalf of the prosecution." Utah R.Crim. P. 15(a). Furthermore, Utah law guarantees
indigent defendants "public assistance for expert witnesses" irrespective of whether they are
represented by the LDA or private counsel. See State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56,fflf31-32, 4 P.3d 795
("There is no indication in [rule 15] that a defendant must be represented by [the] LDA to qualify
for this assistance.")." Id. atf21 (citations original).
Therefore, AOC's interpretation of UIDA, where non-LDA indigents would be ineligible
to access experts, would create many situations where pro-bono representation would be
ineffective. Due to the potential for ineffective assistance of counsel, this would create a
deterring effect on defense council that could significantly affects hundreds if not thousands of
hours passed from private pro bono and retained work to county public defender associations
each year, thus increasing costs to counties throughout the state.
c. Under the plain language of UIDA, counties do not need to prevent non-LDA
represented clients from accessing contracted-for defense resources to prevent
AOC's cited examples of outrageous expert witness defense costs.
AOC cited multiple examples of high costs for witness experts when it attempted to
justify its position.10 Understandably, UIDA was amended, and after Burns, a county had to
provide the expenses for any necessary expert witness an indigent chose. See Burns, Supra, at f

10

See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 12: "Ultimately the court authorized a payment of approximately $25,000
for three experts."
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32. However, if the court plainly reads amended UIDA, indigents must use the appropriate
"contracting defense resource" absent a compelling reason for another expert. This means that
indigents cannot go out and hire any expert they choose, but must instead look to hire an expert
that the county or defender association has found reasonable in cost.
Thus, this plain reading will limit AOCs concern that each county could be liable for
unimaginable and excessive expert witness costs. As stated above, a county can never be sure
how many indigents it may have to provide for every year, but UIDA's current language limits
excessive costs because each county or its hired defender association can contract with experts
that are reasonable in price.
Therefore, AOCs attempt to reinforce SLCs interpretation of UIDA fails because AOC
did not recognize multiple factors the legislature considered in amending UIDA. First, the
legislature likely recognized that budgetary prediction is subordinate to the constitutional
requirements of counties to provide indigents adequate defense. Second, the legislature would
not want to deter county needed pro-bono attorney assistance by overly limiting indigent access
to contracting defense resources. Finally, if a county follows the plain language of UIDA, then it
can prevent those costly situations where indigents retain funding for any expert they choose.
Thus, Mr. Davis' rightfully requested funding for an LDA-contracted experts and defense
resources squarely falls under the amended UIDA.
CONCLUSION
The arguments of SLC and AOC fail to show that the court should disallow non-LD A
represented indigent request for an LDA contracted expert. First, SLC incorrectly identified Mr.
Davis' funding request as one for "noncontracting defense resources" because it improperly
requests that the court look beyond the plain language of UIDA. Specifically, SLC fails to show
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why the court should not consider an LDA contracted expert a "contracting defense resource."
Second, AOC did not justify SLC's sought interpretation of UIDA because it did not recognize
that the legislature likely considered constitutional indigent defense requirements and practical
necessities for adequate indigent defense. Therefore, under UIDA Mr. Davis rightfully requested
funding for an LDA contracted expert and thus Mr. Davis respectfully requests this court to order
the district court to appoint Mr. Davis an LDA contracted expert.

DATED January 7,201L

SEAN\BJ2RUYON
Attorney for Appellant
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